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Abstract 
This paper examines how market structure affects R&D investment at the firm level. Using a sample of 1338 Japanese 
firms, a sample selection model is employed to estimate R&D investment. The pooled sample results suggest that the 
likelihood of conducting R&D is negatively associated with market concentration. However, the relationship becomes 
insignificant when the model is estimated by industry group. Large market sales have a positive effect on the likelihood 
of conducting R&D for both pooled and industry group samples.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the link between market structure and research and development
(R&D) investment using Japanese ﬁrm data. I employ a sample selection model to
estimate R&D investment and focus on a ﬁrm’s endogenous decision whether or not
to participate in non-zero R&D investment taking into account the market structure.
Market share, concentration, and price-cost margin are included as latent variables to
determine the probability of conducting R&D.
Using a sample of 1338 ﬁrms listed on the Japanese Stock Exchanges, I ﬁnd that all
three variables have signiﬁcant eﬀects on ﬁrms’ R&D decisions. The model estimates for
the pooled sample indicate that the relationship between the probability of conducting
R&D and market concentration is negative. This ﬁnding suggests that on average ﬁrms
invest more in R&D in the atomistic setting. However, this tendency is not robust. When
the model is estimated by industry group, the relationship becomes mostly insigniﬁcant.
Large market sales have positive eﬀects on the probability of conducting R&D and
the amount of R&D investment (more exactly, R&D intensity). The result supports
Cohen and Klepper (1996) where a large volume of sales plays an important role in
cost-spreading.
2 Related literature
Theoretical studies have attempted to explain how much to spend on R&D at the ﬁrm
level. Kamien and Schwartz (1972) provide a theoretical foundation for a ﬁrm’s R&D
investment by assuming a random date of innovation arrival. Loury (1979) employs a
model where the amount of R&D investment is positively related to the hazard rate
of innovation. Lach and Rob (1996) assume that a ﬁrm has a dynamic choice between
positive and zero R&D investment. If the expected proﬁt ﬂows with continuing R&D
eﬀorts exceed the ones without R&D eﬀorts, it commits to the positive R&D investment.
Patent race models have also attempted to clarify how incentives to invest in R&D
are aﬀected by market structure. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) study the problem of
R&D investment as a patent race between a monopolist and a challenger. Under the
assumption of a deterministic innovation date, the monopolist will preemptively patent
the innovation whenever entry is expected to lower total duopoly proﬁts. Reinganum
(1983) also examines the eﬀect of monopoly power on incentives to invest in R&D. She
shows that the monopolist invests less than the challenger under the assumption of a
stochastic innovation date.
By committing to innovative activities, ﬁrms can improve product quality. As argued
by Waldman (1996), the introduction of new products of superior quality lowers the
value that consumers place on old products. The R&D decision that maximizes current
proﬁts is not the same as that which maximizes the long-term proﬁts. Gilbert and
Newbery (1982) show that the monopolist might patent innovation and let it sleep; i.e.,
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a proﬁt-maximizing monopolist will never choose to produce the new product.
Empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship between R&D investment and
ﬁrm size. Substantial eﬀort has been devoted to identifying whether the relationship
is proportional and the results are mixed. Using U.S. ﬁrm level data, Bound et al.,
(1984) ﬁnd nonlinearity in the relationship. A large amount of research measures R&D
investment as percent of sales (R&D intensity). Using U.S. business unit data, Cohen
et al., (1987) show that size has some eﬀect on R&D intensity but its magnitude is
very small. Klette and Griliches (2000) argue that the relationship is no more than
proportional by examining Norwegian ﬁrm data. On the other hand, Cohen and Klepper
(1996) examine the role of sales size in spreading R&D costs. They ﬁnd that size has a
positive impact on R&D investment by way of cost-spreading.
Another strand of the literature using microdata examines if there is a link between
R&D investment and market competition. Levin et al., (1985) ﬁnd that there is no
signiﬁcant eﬀect of market concentration on R&D investment when they include direct
measures of technological opportunity and appropriability variables in the regression.
Geroski (1990) ﬁnds negative eﬀects of concentration on R&D outcomes. Aghion et
al., (2005) reexamine the link and ﬁnd a robust relationship. Previous studies based
on microdata show that a considerable fraction of ﬁrms report zero R&D spending.
The large number of ﬁrms reporting zero R&D raises several econometric issues. Using
sample selection models, Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) and Art´ es (2009) examine the
relationship between R&D investment and market power. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004)
show that entrants or ﬁrms with smaller market shares are likely to invest more than
dominant ﬁrms. However, Art´ es (2009) obtains opposite signs of the eﬀects.
3 Empirical model
I follow Lach and Rob (1996) for modeling a ﬁrm’s R&D dynamics. Let Vi be the optimal
value of ﬁrm i conditional on the choice between a value with R&D investment V m
i net













where T is the random success date of innovation, π is the ﬂow of operating proﬁts, x
is R&D investment and r is a constant interest rate. If the ﬁrm succeeds in innovation,
its proﬁts increase to π+α. When the ﬁrm succeeds, it must invest F to implement the
new production technology.
If the ﬁrm invests in R&D, it generates instantaneous probability of success h. Sup-
pose the date of success is an exponential random variable, Pr[t  T] = 1 exp( hT).



















1708Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 no.2 pp. 1706-1716
Now let the hazard function be given by h(x) = x, 0 < γ < 1, and let S denote the





where x/S is R&D intensity, θ = α/S is an incremental price-cost margin, f = F/S is
sunk cost investment per sales and Ψ = (1   γ)
 1 [ln(θ/r   f) + γ lnS]. The probability
of conducting R&D investment rises as γ or θ increases. Smaller sunk cost leads to
higher likelihood of positive R&D when other structural variables, such as sales, are
held constant.
Although f, θ and γ are unobservable, the literature has predicted that the market
structure has eﬀects on some of these variables. In oligopolistic industries, ﬁrms with
large market shares may have superior quality products or market power which enable
them to charge higher prices than their rivals (e.g., Ravenscraft 1983). Firms with
larger shares may be better able to develop a higher increment of price-cost margin.
Increments of price-cost margin obtained by success innovations are predicted to be
larger in concentrated industries. Firms with large output may be more eﬃcient because
of scale economies or a cost-spreading advantage (e.g., Cohen and Klepper 1996). In
accordance with the previous studies, I use market share, Herﬁndahl index, size and
price-cost margin as reduced-form proxies for f and θ and assume γ to be constant.
I follow Art´ es (2009) to estimate the R&D investment. He argues that the market
structure variables have diﬀerent eﬀects on the decisions on whether and how much to
invest in R&D. I employ a sample selection model proposed by Heckman (1974), allowing
for separate eﬀects of market structure on the decision and intensity of R&D. The R&D





= ziβ + ui (4)




i, di > 0
0, di  0 , (6)
where zi and wi are vectors of variables representing market structure and ﬁrm charac-
teristics and ui and vi are error terms. The observed R&D investment function takes
the form of (4) and the selection equation is given by (5) and (6).
Following Amemiya (1985), the joint distribution of (ui,vi) is assumed to be bivariate
normal, BVN(0,0,σ2,1,ρ). The parameters of the investment function and the selection
equation are estimated simultaneously using the maximum likelihood method. Let yi =
ln(xi/Si) denote log of R&D intensity. If ﬁrm i decides to conduct R&D, then its
contribution to likelihood is l(yi,di > 0) = f (ui)Pr(vi >  wiδjui). If ﬁrm i decides not
to conduct R&D, its contribution to likelihood is l(di  0) = Pr(vi   wiδ). The log
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where ϕ() and Φ() are the standard normal density and cumulative distribution
functions. The distribution parameters must satisfy σ > 0 and  1  ρ  1. For
computational convenience, σ and ρ are reparameterized as σ = exp(h) and ρ =
(1   exp(k))/(1 + exp(k)) in the maximum likelihood estimation. The estimates and
standard errors of the distribution parameters are then recovered from the estimates of
h and k.
4 Results
This study uses a sample of 1338 ﬁrms listed on the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya Stock
Exchanges in 1996. There is a data base for company R&D expenditures, which is based
on the questionnaire on R&D expenditures compiled by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, a
Japanese business newspaper. The survey results have been published in Nikkei Kaisha
Jouhou (Nikkei Company Information). The annual R&D expenditures of individual
Japanese ﬁrms are taken from the Summer 1996 edition of Nikkei Kaisha Jouhou. Data
on ﬁrm sales, proﬁts and industry aﬃliation are taken from the company ﬁnancial state-
ments data ﬁle compiled by the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ). The sample covers
53 manufacturing and 3 construction sectors at the three-digit industry classiﬁcation
level. The industry classiﬁcation is based on three-digit codes obtained from the DBJ
data ﬁle. Details are provided in Appendix.
For each observation, R&D intensity xi/Si is measured as the ratio of R&D expendi-
tures to sales. I follow Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) to calculate market share MSi at the
three-digit level as the ratio of ﬁrm i’s sales to the total sales in industry j: Si/
∑
i2j Si.




Since distributions of MSi and Hj are highly skewed, lnMSi and lnHj are used as
regressors. Firm size is measured by lnSi. Price-cost margin PCMi is measured by
value added net of payroll divided by sales. Correlations among variables are presented
in Table I. lnMSi is highly correlated with lnSi. This collinearity might aﬀect the va-
lidity of the model’s parameters. I estimate the model including only lnMSi to avoid
multicollinearity.
Table II shows the empirical results. The model was estimated both including and
excluding industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Column (1) contains parameter estimates for the spec-
iﬁcation that excludes industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Price-cost margin has no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the likelihood of conducting R&D, while having a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on
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Table I: Correlations among variables by sample
(a) All rms: 1338 obs.
lnMSi lnHj PCMi lnSi
lnMSi .
lnHj .380 .
PCMi .047 .042 .
lnSi .632 .028 .005 .
(b) R&D performers only: 1093 obs.
lnMSi lnHj PCMi lnSi
lnMSi .
lnHj .366 .
PCMi .012 .024 .
lnSi .643 .028 -.037 .
R&D intensity. The positive relationship between price-cost margin and R&D inten-
sity suggests that ﬁrms’ R&D intensity increases depending on monopoly rents. On the
other hand, the decision to conduct R&D does not appear to depend on monopoly rents.
lnMSi is positively associated with the likelihood of conducting R&D while negatively
associated with R&D intensity. The positive eﬀect of market share on the likelihood
of conducting R&D is consistent with Cohen and Klepper’s (1996) hypothesis that a
large volume of sales is required to spread the sunk costs of innovation. The negative
eﬀect of market share on R&D intensity indicates that ﬁrms with large market shares
are likely to invest less in R&D. In the patent race context, this supports Reinganum
(1983). lnHj has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likelihood of conducting R&D, while having
a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on R&D intensity. Market concentration increases ﬁrms’
R&D intensity without changing the probability of conducting R&D. Hence, the result
suggests that market competition reduces R&D investment at the industry-wide level.
Column (2) shows parameter estimates from the model, allowing for ﬁxed eﬀects.
The signs and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients of PCMi do not change between column
(1) and (2). The coeﬃcient of lnMSi in the selection equation remains signiﬁcant and
of the same sign. Meanwhile, lnHj becomes signiﬁcant in the selection equation and
insigniﬁcant in the R&D intensity equation after allowing for ﬁxed eﬀects. The coeﬃ-
cient of lnMSi becomes positive and signiﬁcant in the R&D intensity equation. Firms
with large market shares tend to have higher R&D intensity than ﬁrms with small mar-
ket shares. Contrary to the result shown in column (1), this provides support for the
hypothesis maintained by Gilbert and Newbery (1982), that ﬁrms with dominant posi-
tions have more incentives to earn monopoly rents than challengers. This tendency is
also observed in Art´ es (2009) where market share is positively related to the likelihood
of conducting R&D. The eﬀect of concentration on the likelihood of conducting R&D is
negative and signiﬁcant while concentration has no eﬀect on R&D intensity. This sug-
gests, also contrary to column (1), that market competition increases R&D investment
5
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Table II: Sample selection estimation
(1) (2)
Selection equation:
Const. 1.15 (.174)*** a
lnMSi .082 (.024)*** .165 (.033)***
lnHj -.035 (.057) -.217 (.098)**
PCMi .024 (.311) .068 (.416)
R&D intensity:
Const. -4.01 (.166)*** b
lnMSi -.073 (.026)*** .053 (.021)**
lnHj .247 (.057)*** .043 (.061)
PCMi 3.10 (.301)*** 2.54 (.258)***
σ 1.34 (.034)*** .922 (.032)***




Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance: *** at 1%, ** at 5%, and *
at 10% level, respectively. a,b: industry level ﬁxed eﬀects are suppressed.
at the industry level. All coeﬃcients remain of the same sign and signiﬁcance level when
lnMSi is replaced with lnSi (details not shown in table).
Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) and Art´ es (2009) estimate sample selection models with
industry ﬁxed eﬀect dummies, assuming the coeﬃcients of the market structure variables
to be constant across industries. As investigated by Cohen et al., (1987), the coeﬃcients
can vary across industries. In this study, there are insuﬃcient subsample sizes to estimate
the sample selection model by industry. As some of the two-digit industries are relatively
small in terms of sample size, the industries were grouped into ﬁve sectors, as shown in
Appendix, to increase the sample size of each group.
The results are shown in Table III. In the selection equation, PCMi is insigniﬁcant in
all ﬁve groups. In R&D intensity, each coeﬃcient of PCMi is positive and signiﬁcant, but
its magnitude varies across sector groups. The signiﬁcant relationship between PCMi
and R&D intensity, and the insigniﬁcant eﬀect of PCMi on the likelihood of conducting
R&D appear relatively robust to industry heterogeneity concerns. R&D intensity is
relatively more sensitive to price-cost margin in the metals (C) and construction (E)
groups, while less sensitive in the other sector groups. lnMSi has a positive eﬀect on
the likelihood of conducting R&D in group A, C and E, while has no signiﬁcant eﬀect
in group B and D. In other words, the likelihood of conducing R&D is determined
independent of the volume of market sales in some industries (group B and D in this
case) where sunk costs would not play an important role in committing R&D. The eﬀect
of market share on R&D intensity is positive and signiﬁcant in the machinery/equipment
6
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(D) and construction (E) groups and insigniﬁcant in three groups. The coeﬃcient of
lnHj is signiﬁcant only in group E. The negative eﬀect of concentration on the likelihood
of conducting R&D is insigniﬁcant in the other groups. Hence, the negative relationship
between concentration and the likelihood of conducting R&D obtained from the pooled
sample is not robust after allowing the coeﬃcients of market structure variables to
vary across industries. The eﬀect of concentration on R&D intensity is signiﬁcant in
all groups except group A, though the sign of the eﬀect varies across industries. How
market structure variables aﬀect the likelihood and intensity of R&D diﬀers by industry.
In experiments not shown in this paper, essentially the same results were obtained using
lnSi instead of lnMSi.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has examined how market structure aﬀects R&D investment at the ﬁrm
level. The empirical results suggest that the likelihood of conducting R&D is negatively
associated with market concentration and that market share has positive eﬀects on the
likelihood and intensity of R&D, when the coeﬃcients of market structure variables are
assumed homogeneous across industries. On the other hand, when the coeﬃcients are
allowed to vary across industries, the results show that the relationship between the
market structure variables and the likelihood and intensity of R&D tends to be industry
speciﬁc. This study does not include information about appropriability conditions due
to the limitation of data. Further analysis with more detailed data is needed to examine
the discrepancy among the results on the eﬀect of market structure on R&D investment
at the micro-level.
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Appendix
Composition of industry classes
Two-digit industry Obs. Zero R&D exp. Group:
Foods(6) 109 26 A
Textiles(6) 69 24
Paper & Pulp(1) 30 6
Chemicals(7) 170 8 B
Petroleum(1) 8 4
Rubber(2) 19 0
Stone, Clay & Glass(3) 63 6
Iron & Steel(3) 55 18 C
Nonferrous Metals(4) 41 7
Fabricated Metal Products(1) 66 26
Machinery(4) 193 32 D
Electric Equipment(5) 178 18
Transportation Equipment(5) 118 19
Precision Instruments(1) 37 2
Other Manufacturing(4) 24 0 Excluded
Heavy Construction(1) 98 30 E
Dredging(1) 5 0
Other Construction(1) 55 19
Total(56) 1338 245
The number of three-digit industries is in parentheses.
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